UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

CARLOS SOTO #221824,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:05-cv-146

HON. ROBERT HOLMES BELL

CATHY ALTO,

Defendant.

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), the court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992). Applying these standards, the court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

I. <u>Factual Allegations</u>

Plaintiff Carlos Soto, an inmate at the Standish Maximum Correctional Facility (SMF), filed this *pro se* civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Cathy Alto, who is employed by the MDOC as Assistant Deputy Warden at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP). Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that there is a Notice of Intent in his file indicating that he must be confined in protective custody because his life is in danger. Plaintiff states that while he was confined at MBP, Defendant denied Plaintiff protection, causing him to fear for his life. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief.

II. Failure to state a claim

A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. *Jones v. City of Carlisle*, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 510 U.S. 1177, 114 S. Ct. 1218 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988); *Street v. Corrections Corp. of America*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994).

It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to show that Defendant violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. In its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, directing that they may not use excessive physical force against prisoners and must also "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984)). To establish liability under the Eighth Amendment for a claim based on a failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, plaintiffs must show that the prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk that the defendant would cause prisoners serious harm. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. at 834; *Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); *Woods v. Lecureux*, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); *Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1996); *Taylor v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections*, 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir.1995). *See Curry v. Scott*, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant disregarded his NOI for protective custody. However, Plaintiff does not allege or show that he suffered physical injury as a result of Defendant's conduct. Therefore, his Eighth Amendment claim for mental anguish is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which precludes any claim by a prisoner "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." *See Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corr.*, 165 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir.1999); *Gomez v. Chandler*, 163 F.3d 921, 924 (5th Cir.1999); *Zehner v. Trigg*, 133 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir.1997); *Siglar v. Hightower*, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir.1997); *Oliver v. Sundquist*, No. 00-6372, 2001 WL 669994, at *1 (6th Cir. June 7, 2001); *Siller v. Dean*, No. 99-5323, 2000 WL 145167, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000).

Moreover, a transfer to another prison moots a prisoner's request for declaratory or injunctive relief. *Preiser v. Newkirk*, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); *Kensu v. Haigh*, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff was transferred to SMF from MBP following Defendant's

alleged misconduct in this case, his claim for equitable relief is now moot. Preiser, 422 U.S. at 402-

03; Kensu, 87 F.3d at 175.

Conclusion

Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the

court determines that Plaintiff's action fails to state a claim and will therefore be dismissed pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the court dismisses the action, the court discerns no

good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the court will assess the \$255

appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is

barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is

barred, he will be required to pay the \$255 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Date: July 12, 2005

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell

ROBERT HOLMES BELL

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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